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SUPREME COURT'S REQUIREMENTS
-RULES RECENTLY ADOPTED.

he may take the examination for admission to the Supreme Court as soon after
admission to the lower court as he desires.
The rule simply prohibits attorneys who
are not admitted to the lower courts before January 1, 1903, from being admitted
on motion.
The committee appointed by the Supreme
Court to conduct the examination has announced that a pamphlet, containing explanations of the rules, will be ready for
distribution in a short while.

The announcement that the Supreme
Court had adopted rules for admission to
that court that would materially change
the rules now existing caused considerable
uneasiness among the students in the Law
School, until they saw the copy of rules as
adopted. The Associated Press sent out a
story from Pittsburg, where the Supreme
Court adopted the rule, to the effect that
persons not admitted to the lower courts
before January 1, 1903, would be required
LAW STUDENTS REGISTERED.
to take the preliminary examination preThe Board of Law Examiners of Cumscribed by the Supreme Court, and then
berland county received many applications
wait three years to take the examination
for admission. This rule would materially for registration this Fall. Every student in
the Law School who is not registered in
affect the standing of every law student
in the State who should not be admitted the county in which he resides, made application for registration in Cumberland
before January 1st, hence the uneasiness.
The author of the Associated Press story, county, and many of the Law students
however, misconstrued the rules. Acare- who are registered in their home counties,
also registered here.
ful reading of the rules will show that any
The Board decided to adopt the same
person now registered as a student at law
may be admitted to his county court on the requirements for registration as those
same conditions that now exist, unless his adopted by the Supreme Court. Accordcounty board has changed the rules; and ingly the following resolution was adopted:
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Resolved, That the committee request
court to amend Rule of Court 42, relating
to registration of students-at-law, so that
said rule may require all applicants for
registration, as such students, to pass an
examination on subjects required by Supreme Court, (by its rule on the subject
adopted Nov. 11, 1902), in the case of registration for admission to practice in court.
Provided, that any applicant who produces
a certificate showing that he has satisfactorily passed the examination for registration before the State Board of Exatminers, shall be permitted to register in this
county without further examination. Provided further, that this rule of amendment
shall not take effect until July 1, 1903.
The following persons were permitted to
register, some having passed the examination prescribed by the Board, others having presented certificates that were satisfactory to the Board:
Ed. S. Dively.
David Kaufman.
H. E. Fox.
W. L. Houck.
A. L. Reeser.
A. B. Vera.
Geo. W. Cisney.
J. C. Long.
J. R. Jones.
Geo. C. Wolfe.
Leo McDonald.
Paul A. Core.
Leo. J. Schwartzhopf
F. P. Barnhart.
M. S. Kaufman.
Carrol T. Reno.
A. S. Longbottom. Paul 0. Menge.
J. E. Fleitz.
Elmer Ehler.
Chas. S. Hassert.
V. B. Boughton.
H. N. Sipes.
James E. Cary..
Samuel Kauffman.
The Board has conducted its last examination for this year. The next examination will be held in February, 1903.

bleachers, doing good, consistent rooting
Every department
during the game.
yelled together and as a result the rooting
was most effective.
State's team came to town Saturday
morning. At noon a special train carrying State's band and 2-50 ardent rooters
arrived. They, also, paraded, and at the
game occupied the bleachers on the north
side of the field. Their cheering was just
as enthusiastic as Dickinson's, and largely
contributed to the success of their team.
The Law students sat between the College and the Preparatory School students
at the game. Dively and Fleitz led the
Law delegation. Nearly every man in
the Law School .was there.
The Law men on the team this year
are: Carlin, Amerman, and Barnhart.

HON. L. P. HOLCOMB, LL. B.

STATE-DICKINSON GAME.
The annual foot ball game between State
College and Dickinson, played in Carlisle,
Nov. 22, resulted in a score of 23 to 0, in
State's favor. The game was the most
interesting ever played between these
teams, and aroused more enthusiasm
among the under graduates of both institutions than any game heretofore played
by State and Dickinson. Forseveral days
prior to the game, Dickinson's students
assiduously practiced yells and songs, and
held mass meetings, the result of which
wds the exhibition of more spirit on the
day of the game than there has been here of
recent years. Prior to the game the students of the several departments of the
College, preceded by the Indian band, conducted a short parade. At the athletic
field, they occupied the east end of the

One of the recent graduates of the Dickinson School of Law to achieve distinction
was L. P. Holcomb, of the class of 1901. At
the recent election he was elected a member of the Legislature from the Sixth district, Luzerne county, with a large majority.
Mr. Holcomb was born in Askam, Pa.,
about twenty-eight years ago, and resided
there all his life. He attended the public
schools there and in Wilkes-Barre, graduating from the High School in the latter
city. Soon afterward, he was appointed a
clerk in the office of the Recorder of Deeds
of Luzerne county, serving in that capacity
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for several years. Resigning from that
position in 1898, he entered the Dickinsoii
School of Law, being graduated in the
class of 1901 with the degree of LL. B.
Immediately after his graduation, he took
the bar examination in Luzerne county,
and passed creditably the difficult examination prescribed by the board of examiners of that county. He was admitted to
practice in the several courts of Luzerne
ii the fall of 1901, and since then has established a lucrative practice.
The nomination for Representative on
the Republican ticket in the Sixth district,
Mr. Holcomb's home, was given to him
unsolicited, tlie leaders of that party realizing that he was the only man in thd district who could defeat the Democratic
nominee. Their belief in his strength was
justified, for he was elected by a majority
that was beyond the expectations of his
most sanguine friends.
During the time that Mfr. Holcomb was
a student at this institution, he was popular with his fellow-students, and held in
high regard by the Faculty. He was a
member of the Delta Chi fraternity, and
was president of his class in his Senior
year.
ALUMNI NOTES.

E. A. Delaney, of last year's Middle
class, was a candidate for ProthQnotary of
Wayne county, on the Republican ticket,
at the recent election. He was defeated
by a small majority.
Turner, '02, was in town during the past
month, to attend the dance conducted by
the Comus Club. He has been admitted
to the Northampton county bar and is
doing well.
Houser, '02, is located in Lewisburg, Pa.
He'is in partnership with Jno. A. McKee,
an experienced attorney of that place.
Reese, '97, of Plymouth, Pa., has accepted a position in the legal department
of the D. L. & W. R. R. at Scranton.
At the recent election, S.H. Kirk, '97,
was re-elected to represent Fulton county
in the next House of Representatives. He
is a resident of McConnellsburg and has a
paying practice there.
Shipman, '01, was admitted to the
Lancaster Bar during the summer. He
will practice his profession in Lancaster
county.

Hoagland and Schnee of last year's
Middle class were recently admitted to the
Lycoming county bar, having passed the
bar examination of that county.

Miss Sarah Marvel, class of 1900, was in
town recently, the guest of the Misses
Horn. She was admitted to the Philadelphia Bar in the fall of 1900, passing an examination that called forth the commendation of the Board of Examiners.

Guy Thorne, who graduated in the two
years' course in 1902, was admitted to the
Supreme Court when that court was convened in Pittsburg, in October. He is
practicing in Greeneville, Washington
county, and has established a lucrative
business.

Harry P. Katz and Win. Kern, both of
the class of '01, were admitted to the Philadelphia Bar during the summer. Both
being residents of Philadelphia, they will
practice there.

Elmer S. Welsh, of last year's Middle
class, did not return this year. Desiring
to take the bar examination in York
county this fall, and the rules of that
county requiring a short apprenticeship in
a law office before students are eligible for
the final examination, he entered an office
in York, where he resides. He will take
his examination in December.
Stevens, '97, of Reading, was in town
during the past month.

Frank and Joe Rhodes, '02, are located
in West Virginia. They have qualified
to practice in that State, and reports from
them say that they are doing well.
Kline, '01, of Freeland, recently conducted his first murder case, and succeeded
in having his client acquitted. He conducted his case Nith skill and confidence,
and was warmly congratulated at the termination of the suit by the older members
of the bar.
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SCHOOL NOTES.
It has been suggested that the Allison
and Dickinson Societies conduct an intersociety debate this year. Of this suggestion we earnestly approve. Recently there
has been a tendency, in both societies, to
subordinate debating for exercises of a
more amusing, but less instructive, character than debates. As a result, the members are not obtaining the advantages for
which the societies were organized, and
the interest in the societies' work is beginning to wane. An, inter-society debate
will revive and maintain this interest until
the end of the school year. There are excellent debaters in both societies, and an
interesting debate could be arranged.
Kauffman, of theSenior class, is writing
a book, entitled "Causes for Trouble, or
the Pedigree of a Child." It will be ready
for press about the first of next January,
and should have a large sale. The book
treats of the social conditions existing in
this country and Europe to-day. The
author has made a special study of these
conditions, and writes and talks interestingly about them. Untilrecently, he was
an officiating rabbi in the orthodox Jewish
Church. Being educated in Europe, and
residing in this country for several years,
his work should contain interesting reading.
The Senior class has elected the following officers:
President-Walter P. Bishop.
Vice-President-W. N. Cooper.
Secretary-J. S. Peightel.
Treasurer-Charles Hickernell.
Historian-Fred. B. Gerber.
From 6,776 students registered in the
Law Schools in 1892, the number has increased until at present there are over
14,500 students enrolled in the different
Law Schools.
Ed Rogers, who captained the Indian
foot ball team in 1901, and who was a
member of the present Senior class in its
Junior year, is continuing his law studies
at the University of Minnesota. He is a
member of the foot ball team of that institution and reports from there say he is
playing a fast game.

Law students will probably be iiterested
in knowing the attendance at the ten
largest Law Schools in the United States.
The following was the attendance for 19011902:
University of Michigan Law School .... 854
New York Law School ........................ 811
Harvard Law School ........................... 632
New York University Law School .... .611
Columbian University Law School ...... 515
University of Minnesota Law School .. 504
Columbia University Law School ........ 439
University of Pennsylvania Law
School ............................................. 375
Boston University Law School ............ 834
Georgetown University Law School....288
Keelor, who was injured in the students'
celebration of Dickinson's defeat of Annapolis on the gridiron, Oct. 25th, has resumied his studies after an absence of
three weeks. He was in the hospital the
greater part of the time. His leg was so
badly injured that he has abandoned his
intention of participating in track events
this year. This will be regretted, for he
was one of the fastest men on the team.
Cannon, a member of the present Senior
class, who did not return this year, was in
town to witness the State-Dickinson
game. He is coaching a foot ball team in
Hazelton, his home, and is pursuing his
studies in a law office there.
Edward Gerber, a student at State College, was a guest of his brother Fred,
Senior Law, a few days subsequent to the
game between his college and Dickinson.
Carlin, of the Middle class, has been appointed captain of the college base ball
team. This will be his second year on the
team. Last year he played centre field,
and occasionally pitched.
Heller, of the Junior class, who was
elected assistant manager of the base ball
team last spring while he was a student
in the college, has resigned. His entering
the Law School made it impossible for him
to further act as assistant manager.
Mr. and Mrs. A. V. Dively, of Altoona,
were visiting their son Ed. of the Middle
class, for several days during the past
month.

THE FORUM
BOOK REVIEW.
A:SBoTT's TRIAL BRIEF.-A brief for
trial of criminal cases. By Austin Abbott,
assisted by Wm. C. Beecher, late Assistant
District Attorney of New York. Second
and enlarged edition. Lawyers' Co-operalive PublishingCo., Rochester, NY.Y., 1902.
This edition has been enlarged by the
publisher's editorial staff. It is about
twice the size of the first edition and its
eitations are thorqugh and brought down
to date. The work is so conveniently arranged that a casual glance will enable
one to trace the trial of a criminal case
step by step. To one engaged in criminal
practice, it is an invaluable work. The
arrangement of its chapters, the thoroughness of its citations, and the clearness ofits
ptyle, should make It as popular as the
original edition.
With Vol. V of their Cyclopedia of Law
and Procedgre, The American Law Book
Company present to the consideration of
the legal profession an innovation in law
book making which cannot but appeal
forcibly to every lawyer. The innovation
referred to consists in a small volume of
annotations bringing down to date the
articles published in the first four volumes
of the work.
The importance to the profession of this
event can hardly be exaggerated, for it
means relief in a large measure from the
awful drudgery of finding the law, and
moreoverinsures a law book which, instead
of depreciating, will actually increase in
value year by year.

MOOT COURT.
COMmONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA vs. ADAMS.
Larceny of growing crops-Severance and
removal by continuous act not larcenyQuashingindictment
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Defendant is indicted, charged with the
larceny of two bushels of potatoes. The
facts are, that on the evening of October
1, 1902, Adams entered the field of the
prosecutor, Tod, and unearthed the potatoes which were still in their natural state,
placed the same in a bag and made off.

29

Counsel for the prisoner moves the court
that the indictment be quashed.
HUBLER and JAMES for the prisoner.
Things pertaining to realty can be subject of larceny only when severance and
asportation are not one continuous act.
Com. v. Steimling, 156 Pa. 400; People v.
Williams, 35 Cal. 671 ; Ogden v. Riley, 14
N. J. L. 186; People v. Loomis, 4 Den.
(N. Y.) 380.
As to what constitutes a continuous act;
see,-Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 18,
519; Bishop Cr. Law,Vol. 1, see. 782, note 5.
KNAPPENBERGER and JACOBS for the
Commonwealth.
Emblements andfructus industriales,at
common law, are treated as chattels
though still annexed. 4 Kent's Corn. 73 ;
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 9, Crops.
Digging, picking and carrying away of
potatoes is not one continuous act, but is
larceny. Com. v. Steimling, 156 Pa. 400 ;
Whart. Cr. Law. 8th ed., sec. 864; Bishop
Cr. Law, 4th ed., sec. 781.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an indictment for the larceny of
growing potatoes. Defendant moves to
have the indictment quashed, contending
that the potatoes were realty, and that, in
this state, there can be no larceny of things
real. At common law things personal,
only, could be the subjects of larceny. 2
Bishop on Criminal Law, 780. Here those
things which are the subjects of larceny
are discussed at length, and a very fine
distinction, as to when an act constitutes
larceny and when it is only a trespass, is
drawn.
In I Hales P. C. 510, we find this statement: "Larceny cannot be committed of
things that adhere to the freehold, as
trees, grass, bushes, hedges, stones or lead
of a house, or the like, but, if they are severed from the freehold, as wood cut, grass
in cocks, or stones dug out of a quarry,
then felony may be committed by stealing
them, for then they are personal estate."
Thus we find that potatoes growing in the
ground were, at common law and in the
early English decisions, considered as
realty, and consequently were not the subjects of larceny.
We have thoroughly examined the decisions in Pennsylvania on this subject, and
have found the rule to be nearly the same.
In Buttinger v. Baker, 29 Pa. 66, it was
held that "growing crops before maturity,
and unsevered from the soil, are part and
parcel of the land on which they grow."
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See also Long v. Seavers, 103 Pa. 517, and
Bear v. Betger, 16 Pa. 175. In examining
the authorities and decisions on the subject as to when an act is larceny and when
trespass, we find that if the potatoes had
been unearthed, and the defendant had
then carried them away, then the act, all
the other elements being present, would
have been larceny, as the potatoes would
have then been personalty; but in the case
at bar, the potatoes are growing, and defendant goes upon prosecutor's land and
unearths them. Whether this was larceny
or trespass depends still further whether
the unearthing and the carrying away
was one continuous act or not. So far as
we can glean from the statement of facts,
we are of opinion that the unearthing and
the carrying away was a continuous act,
therefore making the act one of trespass
and not one of larceny.
There is a statute in Pennsylvania.
namely, the Act of June 8, 1881 (P. & L.,
Vol. 1. col. 1262), relating to malicious mischief to gardens, orchards, etc., under
which this defendant can be successfully
prosecuted and punished, and in accordance with which this action should have
been brought.
Tile motion of the defendant to quash
the indictment is granted.
EBBERT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It does not appear whether the owner of
the potatoes was the owner in fee of the
land, or a mere tenant of it. If he was a
tenant, the potatoes were clearly personalty. As every reasonable intendment
should be made in favor of the defendant,
we shall assume that the potatoes were
planted by, and belonged to, the owner of
the fee; and that he was in possession both
of the soil and of them, at the time of the
alleged asportation.
Annual crops, even when put into the
ground by the owner of the land, are said
to be personalty. Contracts concerning
them are not within the statute of frauds.
They can, as personalty, be levied on by
the sheriff, and sold. On the death of the
owner, tile land passes in one direction
and the crops in another; the former to
the heirs, the latter to the administrator,
and through him to the next of kin, who
may be a different person from the heir.
Of. Hershey v. Metzgar, 90 Pa. 217.

It is also true that if the owner sells the
laud, without excepting the crops, he is
understood to sell them with it; and that
if the sheriff levies on and sells the land,
he also sells the crops as if a part of it.
The crops then have a somewhat ambiguous position. For some purposes they
are personalty; for others, realty.
In the few cases. to which our attention
has been directed, in which the question
has been considered, they have been considered as realty, so far as their being the
subject of an alleged larceny at common
law was concerned. It has been held that
taking up potatoes, and carrying them
away, under circumstances that, were
the subject personalty, would make
the act larceny, is not larceny at
common law. Comfort v. Fulton,
39 Barb. 56; Bell v. State, 63 Tenn.
426. The same has been held of corn.
State v. Stevenson, 2 Bailey 334 [S. C.].
Says Blackstone, Vol. 4, p. 232: ",This
felonious taking and carrying away must
be of the personal goods of another; for, if
they are things real, or savor of the realty,
larceny at the common law cannot be committed of them.

*

*

*

*

And of

things likewise that adhere to the freehold, as corn, grass, trees, and the like, *
*

*

*

no larceny could be committed

by the rules of the common law."
Illogical as it may seem, having defined
larceny as "the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of
another;" 4 Black. 230, and having classified annual crops as personalty, Hershey
v. Metzgar, 90 Pa. 217 ; Long v. Seavers,
103 Pa. 517; Backenstoes v. Stahler, 33 Pa.
251; to say that the taking and carrying
away of such crops are not larceny, we
agree with the learned court below that
they are not larceny.
Potatoes like trees, fixtures, ore, sand,
etc., can be separated from the earth, and
become true chattels, and, after they have
become such, they may be stolen. But the
act of separating them and taking them
away must not be continuous. The indictment so defines the act of the defendant, that the digging up, putting into a
bag and carrying off must be taken to have
been continuous. It was, therefore, at
common law, a trespass against the land,
not a larceny of personal property.
Judgment affirmed.
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RINK'S ESTATE.
.Pxceptions to Auditor's report-When a,
debt becomes a lien onpersonalty-How
lost-Distribution of personalty of decedents-Act of February24, 1834.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Holcomb sold a farm for $4,200 to Rink.
He took a judgment for $2,000 of the purchase money, and notes for another $1,000.
The rest was paid in cash. When the
judgment became payable, Holcomb issued execution and sold the farm for $1,600,
the buildings having been destroyed by
fire. Shortly after the issue and before
return of the ft. fa., Rink died. The administrator's personal estate amounted to
$900. The fund was claimed by Holcomb
and by Hetrick, who had lent $600 to Rink.
The auditor directed division of the fund
pro rata between them. Both Holcomb
and Hetrick except, each claiming all.
GERBER and WILLIAMSON for Hetrick.

The lien of judgments binds real estate
only. Trickett on Liens, Vol. 1, page 221.
Judgment creditors' rights over personalty
only become superior to simple contract
debtors upon issuance of aft.fa., and levy
before next return day. Person's Appeal,
78 Pa. 145.
SCHANZ and MYERS for Holcomb.

A valid lien of execution is not destroyed
by the death of the defendant. Connell
v. O'Neil, 154 Pa. 582.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiffs in this case contend that
Holcomb is entitled to the sum of $400 in
full payment of the balance due him on
the judgment for $2,000. The defendants
maintain that the decree of the auditor in
awarding the fund to be distributed pro
rata between the exceptants was proper
and without error. The main question in
this case seems to be whether theft, fa. on
the personalty retains its lien, in which
case the judgment for the remaining $400
will be paid first; or if it does not retain
its lien, then the fund realized from the
sale of the personalty will be distributed
according to the rule established for the
distribution of decedents' estates.
In Person's Appeal, 78 Pa. 145, it was
held that rights over personalty only become superior to simple contract debtors
upon the issuance of aft. fa. and levy before the next return day, in which case
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they have a lien from the time the writ
reaches the hands of the sheriff. The
statement of facts, however, does not warrant us in saying that the goods were levied
on before the death of the decedent.
In Mason's Appeal, 89 Pa. 402, it was
held that the proper method of distributing insolvent decedents' estates is to divide
the personal assets pro rata among all
debtors regardless of quality, then to satisfy
the balance of the debts, which are liens
upon the realty, out of the proceeds derived from the sale of realty, in otder of
their priority. After this, if a balance remains, it should be divided pro rata
among all unpaid debts. This case seems
to be closely related to the one at bar.
The court is of the opinion that since the
lien of theft. fa. on the personalty is not
upheld, because the levy is not a certainty,
the fund of $900 must be distributed according to the provisions of the Act of
Feb. 24, 1834; and since neither of these
claims is a preferred debt, the proceeds
realized from the sale of the personalty
must be distributed pro rata. The report
of the auditor is affirmed.
JONES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The learned court below properly coneluded that there was no right of precedence in Holcomb. He issued aft.fa. before the death of Rink, which occurred before the return of the writ. What the
nature of the personalty was, is not disclosed. It may have been debts due Rink
or moneys in his hands, on which a f. fa.
could not be levied, or could not become a
lien. The return day may have passed before alevy was made, whereby the lien previously gained, was relaxed. If Holcomb
has no lien on the personalty, he would be
entitled simply to share ratably with Hetrick.
Holcomb's debt arose from his sale of a
farm. The price of it was $4,200. Of this
amount twelve hundred dollars were paid
in cash. Notes for $1,000 were taken. A
judgment for $2,000 was confessed. The
buildings having been destroyed by fire,
the value of the farm was so far diminished
that it sold, on execution, for but $1,600.
There remained unpaid of the purchase
money, over $400. Was this a debt, for
payment of which resort could be had to
the personal or other estate of Rink?
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Had there been no conveyance of the
land, Holcomb's sale on the judgment
would be regarded as extinguishing the
contract and also Rink's debt. Love v.
Jones, 4 W. 465; Purviance v. Lemmon, 16
S. & R. 292; Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v.
Jones, 59 Pa. 433. We think, however,
though the fact is not explicitly stated,
that it is to be taken as granted, that the
conveyance was made. The whole of the
purchase money was paid or secured by
notes or a judgment. The legal estate, as
well as the equitable, thereupon passed to
Rink. In such a case, the sale of it in execution for the unpaid purchase money
does not rescind the contract, and preclude
a resort to the debtor's other property for
the residue of the purchase money. Wolfe's
Appeal, 110 Pa. 126.
Appeal dismissed.
CHAS. BLANKENBURG vs. FRED.
HILL.
Miing-1.ights of subjacent supportStatute of limitation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hill owned coal over which was land of
plaintiff, on which was a residence, an
orchard, etc. Hill's predecessor in ownership had, in 1891, removed all coal under
plaintiff's land. He conveyed his mine
to the defendant in April, 1892, and Hill
then, in 1894, continued the mining under
the tracts adjacent to the plaintiff. The
result was that the plaintiff's surface caved
in and his house and orchard were destroyed in the spring of 1897. He brought
this action of trespass in 1898. He seeks
as damages the loss on account of the destruction of his house and orchard, etc.
The court was asked to charge: (a)
Statute of limitations as a bar. (b) Damages are the difference between the market
value of the premises before and after the
cave in.
KEELoR and WnIGHT for the plaintiff.
There is no cause of action unless the
miner left no pillars, or too few of them.
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474. A cause
of action arises from failure to afford the
surface sufficient support when the coal
has been removed. Lunny v. Coal Co.,
166 Pa. 536; McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa.
159. Statute of limitation begins to run
from time of the discovery of the injury.
Lewly v. Frick Coke Co., 166 Pa. 556.

DRUMHELLBR and DELANEY for the
defendant.
The measure of damages is the diminution in the market value of the property
from the time mining began. Rockland
Kaler Co. v. Tillson, 69 Me. 269; Sedgwick
on Damages (8th ed.), see. 932; Herbert v.
Rainy, 162 Pa. 525; McGettigan v. Potts,
149 Pa. 155.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Plaintiff brings this action to recover for
injury to his property, caused by the "caving in" of the surface of his land. The
"cave in" was caused by the mining of
coal by defendant, or his predecessors in
ownership.
The coal immediately under plaintiff's
land was mined by defendant's grantee in
1891. The defendant, after acquiring possession in 1894, continued the mining under the land adjacent to plaintiff's. The
"cave in" occurred in 1897, and plaintiff
commenced this action in 1898, more than
six years after the mining under plaintiff's
land. The first question, therefore, is:
What was the date of the cause of action?
A cause of action is that which produces
or effects the results complained of.
Where there has been a horizontal division of land, the owner of the subjacent
estate, coal or other mineral, owes to the
superincumbent owner a right of support.
This is an absolute right, arising out of the
ownership of the surface. Therefore, the
right of action arose when the mine operator failed to provide sufficient support.
That was more than six years before the
suit was brought.
The date of the "cave in," and destruction of the house and orchard, was not the
date of the cause of action. That was only
the consequence of a previous cause. Since
the surface owner had a right to subjacent
support, he had the right to enter the
mine, and see that his right was being
maintained by the person mining the coal
under the land. This he did not do, and
he cannot now, after the expiration of six
years, maintain this action. In no case,
however, would defendant be responsible
for the acts of his predecessors.
Judgment for defendant.
CANNON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

What was the duty which Hill violated?
Was it to keep under the surface of Blankenburg's land a sufficient support ? Or
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was it the duty not to cause the cave in of
the land, in consequence of the want of
support? If the latter, the breach occurred
in less than six years before the inception
of the suit; if the former, the cause of action was more than six years old. The
House of Lords, highest appellate court in
Great Britain, has adopted the latter view.
Bonomi v. Backhouse, 96 Eng. C. L 642.
The former view is taken by the Supreme
Court of this State, in Noonan v. Pardee,
200 Pa. 474. In that case, the wrong is said
to consist, not in producing the effect, but
in bringing into existence the initial link
in a chain of causes. Though the removal
of the coal support occurs to-day, the concurrence of other causes through a period
of ten or twenty years may be needed to
disturb the surface. The cause of action
is, nevertheless, the removal of the coal,
not the effect more or less remotely ensuing.
Many duties are not to refrain from
acts, but to refrain from their consequences. There is no duty, e. g., to be
careful. The only duty is, to avoid hurt
to another as a consequence of carelessness.
Aman driving acarriage recklesslythrough
the street has violated no duty towards a
pedestrian He first violates a duty when
he runs into the pedestrian. His want of
care would support no action, unless it had
caused hurt.
There are many acts which are tortious,
because they produce or tend to produce
harm. They are actionable before the
harm has been produced. For libel or
slander, a new cause of action does not
come into existence with every successive
detrimental impression made by it. The
suit must be brought in a period measured
from the publication.
Judgment affirmed.
SAMUEL JACOBS vs. THE BANK.
Depositor's duty to bank-Altered checks
-Bank relieved by negligence of dePositor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jacobs was a depositor in the bank. He
drew a check for $200. His clerk, with
acid, erased the word "hundred," inserting in the same place the word "thousand," and adding a cipher to the figures
200. The bank paid the check which was
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presented by one to whom the clerk handed
it. Two months afterwards, Jacobs' bank
book was balanced and his checks returned. He asked the clerk to verify, who
reported that all was right. Four months
after this, Jacobs discovered the forgery,
and demanded the $2,000 from the bank.
In the meantime, the clerk who had been
speculating failed, and fled to parts unknown. Had the bank been informed of
the fraud at any time prior to one month
before the clerk's departure it might, by
action or threatened prosecution, have recovered the money from the clerk. In the
action for the $2,000, the court said to the
jury that the evidence disclosed no defence. Appeal.
WALSHr and VASTINE for the plaintiff.
A bank paying a forged or an altered
check is liable to depositor for full amount,
if forged, and to raised amount, if altered.
Weisse v. Dennison, 10N. Y. 68; Welsh v.
German American Bank, 73 N. Y. 126.
A depositor, on return of his paid checks,
is not bound to examine them to see that
they are correct. United Security Co. v.
The Bank, 185 Pa. 586.
Notice to agent is not notice to principal, if agent has a personal interest which
would lead him to conceal it. Barnes v.
Trenton Gas Co., 27 N. J. E. ; Gunster v.
Scranton Power Co., 181 Pa. 327; Allen v.
Boston R. R. Co., 150 Mass. 200.
DRUMHELLER and EBBERT for the de-

fendant.
Failure of depositor to examine and accept or reject checks prevents his disputing the bank's credits. Leather Manufacturing Co. v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96;
United Security Co. v. Nat. Bank, 185 Pa.
586; Myres v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1.
Having delegated authority to an agent,
depositor is responsible for his omission or
commission. Gunster v. Scranton Power
Co., 181 Pa. 327; Myres v. Bank, supra.
Bank is not bound to know writing in
body of check. Leather Manufacturing
Co. v. Morgan, supra; Dana v. Bank, 132
Mass. 156.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In their relations with depositors, banks
are held, as they ought to be, to rigid responsibilities. But the principles governing those relations ought not to be so extended as to invite or encourage such
negligence by the depositors in the examination of their bank accounts as is inconsistent with the relation of the parties, or
with those established rules and usages,
sanctioned by business men of ordinary
prudence and sagacity, which are, or
ought to be, known to depositors.

34

THE FORUM

In the case under consideration there is
a loss which must fall either upon the
bank or upon its depositor, Jacobs. This
is unfortunate, for it appears that each
was attempting to deal fairly with the
other.
If the loss is to fall upon the depositor,
it will be either becausehe is bound by the
acts of his agent, or on account of his failure
to notify the bank of the agent's altering
the check, from which failure the bank has
lost a complete remedy. If the bank is
liable, it can be upon the only ground,
that it has authority to pay out its depositor's money only under the depositor's direction, and that this was paid out not at
the direction of its depositor.
The theory, that notice to the agent is
notice to the principal, is not sustained in
case of such conduct by the agent as raises
a question of clear presumption, that he
would not communicate the fact in controversy, as where the agent acts for himself, in his own interest, and adversely to
that of the principal. A fraud committed
by an agent on his own account is beyond
the scope of his authority, and bears an
analogy to a tort willfully committed by a
servant for his own purpose, and not a
means of performing the business entrusted to him by his master. Gunster v.
Scranton Power Co., 181 Pa. 327; Allen v.
South Boston R. R. Co., 150 Mass. 200.
This case falls within the above rule.
In Myres v. The Bank, 193 Pa. 1, which
followed Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96, it
would seem that the principal, in cases of
this kind, should be bound by the act of
the agent. That was a case of forgery,
which covered a period of two and a half
years. The loss fell upon the depositor,
because if he had examined his bank book
and compared check stubs, the forgery
would have been discovered, and thus prevented the bank's paying out money on
subsequently forged checks. "No objection having been made at first settlement,
the bank had the right to assume that
everything was correct." In the case at
bar, no payments were made after the first
mispayment. The bank did not act in
any way upon the failure of Jacobs to notify it that the checks had been altered.
It is also to be observed that the signature is the essential part of a check, and
the bank is not bound to pay any attention
to the handwriting of the other parts, un-

less it shows something to excite suspicion.
United Security Co. v. Bank, 185 Pa. 586.
"To require a bank in most cases to know
by whom the body of a check was written
would be to require an impossibility. Such
a rule would not only be arbitrary and rigorous, but unjust. National Bank of Commerce v. Banking Association, 55 N. Y.
211.
The parties are both innocent. But from
a perusal of the cases bearing upon this
case, it seems that a bank has authority to
pay out its depositor's money only upon
his check. When a bank pays a check
which is presented, it must, at its peril,
ascertain whether such check is genuine.
Should it not be genuine, it will entitle.
the bank to no credit against the depositor's account. "Had Jacobs notified the
bank one month before the clerk's departure, it might, by action or threatened
prosecution, have recovered the money."
The courts will not go into speculative
questions as to what might or might not
have been the result from an earlier discovery of the fraud. Bank v. Bank, 159
Pa. 46. At time of mispayment, the bank
was liable to Jacobs, and we fail to discover anything that has cancelled their
debt to him, though his laches are not to
be commended.
Judgment affirmed.
SHERBINE,

J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The bank is bound to honor the checks
of its depositor. It has no right to pay out
his funds, on a check which he has not
made nor authorized, and, in respect to
whose execution or alteration, he has not
been negligent. Jacobs drew the $200
check. It was genuine. His clerk altered
it. It does notappearthatany negligence
of Jacobs promoted the success of the alteration. It was not negligent to employ
a clerk, who has, in fact, committed a
fraud. It was not negligent to use an ink
which could be removed by an acid. The
act of the clerk cannot be imputed on any
apparent ground, to Jacobs, his employer.
When, then, the bank paid the clerk's
deputy $2,000, it paid $1,800 more than it
was authorized to pay. The payment of
the $200 was in accordance with Jacobs'
direction, and, it seems, for his benefit.
The bank, therefore, is, were there nothing
more in the case, liable to pay the plaintiff, not $2,000, but $1,800.
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The bank balanced the book of its depositor, and returned to him the checks
for paying which it claimed credit.. He
should, as a prudent man, promptly have
examined them, and decided upon the
correctness of the credits claimed. Myers
v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1; Critten v. Chemical
Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219 Nay, he owed
a duty to the bank either thus to examine
and disavow checks found not genuine, or
to acquiesce in the bank's act, should his
disavowal put a loss on it which his
promptness would have prevented. If, e.
g., the bank is, by his seeming assent to
the accuracy of checks, induced to honor
others having the same defects, he will
preclude himself from denying the proprietk' of its act of so honoring them. 193
Pa. 1.
It does not appear that any other altered
checks were paid by the bank in consequence of Jacobs' apparent assent to the
soundness of the one in question. It does
appear, however, that, had the bank been
informed of the clerk's forgery a month
prior to his flight, it might have recovered
the money paid on the cheek from him.
We are to presume that it would have
taken the steps needful to secure itself,
and, had it done so, they would have led
to success. It follows, we think, that
Jacobs is responsible for the loss which his
prevailing in the present action will hmpose on the bank if he ought to have discovered the fraud betimes, and given notice of it to the bank. 171 N. Y. 219. He
alleges that in committing the examination of his bank book and ot the checks to
the forging clerk he did all that it was incumbent on him to do. We think not
The bank is not responsible for the misconduct of the clerk, in falsely reporting to
Jacobs that the credits claimed by the
bank in the book were "right." For his
own convenience Jacobs deputed this work
to another instead of doing it himself.
He cannot thus change his duties towards
the bank. He takes the risk, not the
bank, when he employs a clerk for this
purpose. Myers v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1; Critten v. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219.
Thejury might have found, from the
evidence, that had Jacobs given the notice
to the bank one month prior to the escape of
the clerk, the bank could have, and would
have made itself whole. Had itso found,
it would follow that the loss which was in
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the first instance upon it, was transferred
to the plaintiff.
It is to be observed that we predicate
this conclusion on the absence of negligence on the part of the bank. Whether,
had it negligently paid the check, it could
take advantage of the subsequent nonnegligent failure of Jacobs to notify it of
the forgery, we refrain from considering.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
TID vs. SEMPLE.
of one partFraud-Partnership-Deceit
ner-Liabilityof one partnerto another
for deceit.
STATEIENT OF THE CASE.

On January 1st, Semple and Tid formed
a partnership to engage in the grocery
business, each placing in the concern $2,000.
Tid supposed that Semple was perfectly
solvent, and would never have entered
into the business had not Semple assured
him repeatedly during the consummation
of the partnership that "he could hold up
his end of the string." Two months later
Semple made an assignment with the result that Tid, being solvent, had the firm
debts to pay, the firm assets not being sufficient. As a matter of fact Semple was
insolvent at the time of the forming of the
partnership. Tid now brings an action
against Semple for fraud.
PRICK=

and WILCOX for plaintiff.

The fraud of one partner dissolves the
partnership, and the innocent party has a
right of action against his guilty partner.
Defendant's statement of his responsibility
was at least recklessly made, and has the
same effect as if defendant had knowledge
of its falsity. Defendant was bound to
know his own financial condition. 122
Mass. 132; 71 N. Y. 594; 6 Pa. 31; 1 Yates
528; 2 Pa. 376.
WILLIS and SHoMo for defendant.

Defendant's statement was a mere expression of opinion. To support an action
in deceit, plaintiff must show: (1) That
the representation was untrue, (2) that defendant knew it was untrue, (3)that it was
made to induce defendant to act, (4) that
defendant did act upon it to his damage.
100 Pa. 249; 23 Pa. 178; 31 Pa. 324; 149
Mass. 188; 146 Mass. 86.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Tid entered into a partnership under
the influence of the belief that Semple, his
partner, was solvent. Semple was in fact
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insolvent. From these facts, alone, springs
no right of action.
From the fact that Semple was insolvent
may the jury find that he knew it? We
have no information as to the degree or
the occasion of his insolvency. It might
have been so gross, and have lasted so long.
that his ignorance of it would be very improbable. Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v.
Gaul, 170 Pa. 545. But, it might also be
slight. It might have been occasioned by
an unexpected, and as yet, undetected loss
of value of his assets. We do not think
that the jury should be allowed to infer
Semple's knowledge of it, from the insolvency merely.
But, even if Semple knew it, would his
entering into the relation of partner with
Tid, be a fraud? He was not unable to
pay the contribution he agreed to pay. He
paid the $2,000. What reason had he to
anticipate that the firm itself would become
insolvent, so that resort to the individual
liability of the partners would become
necessary? His individual insolvency had
no agency in rendering the firm insolvent.
Though one is insolvent, he often is able
financially to recuperate. Knowledge of
his present insolvency was not equivalent
to knowledge that at some future time the
firm having grown insolvent and its creditos recurring to t.he partners, he would be
unable to meet his share of the debts. It
has been held in Pennsylvania that to
purchase goods, knowing that one is insolvent, is not ipsofacto, a fraud. Smith v.
Smith, 21 Pa. 367; Backenstoes v. Specher,
31 Pa. 324; Cf. Rodman v. Thalheimer, 75
Pa. 232; Wessels v. Weiss, 156 Pa. 591. We
do not think that entering into any other
kind of a contract, involving an assumption of liability, is a fraud, merely because
the party is, and knows that he is, insolvent.
But, it appears that Semple repeatedly
assured Tid that "he could hold up his end
of the string," and the jury might possibly
find that by these words, he intended Tid
to understand that he, Semple, was expressing the belief that he would be able to
meet all the liabilities growing out of the
partnership transactions. The words express opinion concerning a future fact.
We think there is no fraud in them, if'the
opinion really existed.
What is there to show that this opinion
did not exist? Unless we know more of

the size of the deficiency of Semple's
assets, with respect to his liabilities, and
how and when it became apparent, we are
not justified in affirming that the declaration of opinion was untrue. Though insolvent in fact he may have believed what
he said. He may have been ignorant,
when he ought to have known, or he may
have judged his future financial ability
with foolish optimism, but the law does
not make him liable for these traits. If
two months later his liabilities greatly exceeded his assets, an inference might be
drawn that he was aware of his insolvency
when the firm was entered into, and also
that he could not believe and therefore
did not believe, that he could hold up his
end of the string. In the evidence educed,
we find no support for a verdict implying
that conclusion.
Plaintiff non-suit.

STOKES vs. HAINES.
Instrument under seal-Subscribing witnesses- When. theirtestimony may be dispensed with.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Stokes alleging that he was owner of a
house that Haines had entered and destroyed by fire, brought an action of trespass.
The house had been erected on leased
land by Stokes, and he had theright of removing it. Haines alleged that Stokes
sold it by bill of sale to one Coleman prior
to the alleged trespass.
A bill of sale purport was offered, having two subscribing witnesses. Defendant
not calling these witnesses nor explaining
why he did not, offered to call himself and
Stokes; himself to prove the execution.
The court excluded the witnesses.
Judgment was granted in favor of
Stokes.
KAUFFmAN for the plaintiff.
Bill of sale is not foundation of action,
hence provable by any competent evidence.
Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa. 452; Schanberger v. Hackman, 37 La. 92; Gallagher v.
Cnrporation, 149 Ore. 25.
JONES and KELOI for the defendant.
Subscribing witnesses must be called to
prove execution of sealed instruments.
Hautz v. Rough, 2 S. & R, 349; Hay v.
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Kramer, 2 W. & S. 138; Brobst v. Wilker,
8 Pa. 467; 1 Greenleafon Evidence, Sec: 569:
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Does an admission by the maker of an
instrument under seal, witnessed by subscribing witnesses, dispense with the rule
which requires the calling of the subscribing witnesses to prove execution of the
same?
Lord Ellenborough, 0. J., expressed the
sentiments of the English courts when he
said, in Kray v. Inhabitants, 4 M. & S.
353, decided in 1815, "But if any general
rule is to prevail, this (referring to the necessity of calling thesubscribing witnesses)
is certainly one that is as fixed, formal
and universal, as any thatcan be stated in
a court of justice," again, "If there ever
was a case in which the rule might reasonably have been relaxed, It was surely the
case of Abbott v. Plumber, yet in that
case the court held the rule to be inexorable."
The American courts, generally, have
closely adhered to this doctrine, departing
from it only in a few exceptional cases in
which the inconvenience caused by requiring the subscribing witnesses, the nature
of the instrument witnessed, and the improbability of injury resulting to the declarant justified the relaxation.
The New York courts were among the
first to recognize an exception to the rule.
In Hall v. Phelps, 2 Johnson 45, decided
in 1807, they held, in an action on a promissory note witnessed by two subscribing
witnesses, that proof of an admission by
the payor was sufficient proof of execution.
The court argued that the confession was
high proof, highly convenient and productiveofnoinjury. The question again came
before the same court one year later. It
was a suit on a bond to which the defendant pleaded non estfactum. Evidence of
an admission by the defendant, a short
time before the institution of the suit, that
the bond was duly executed was excluded
on the ground that the subscribing witnesses were not called. ChiefJustice Kent
delivered the opinion of the court sustaining the lower court and proceeded in part:
"The case of Hall v. Phelps has been
thought to have decided this question. I
do not consider it in that light. That case
arose upon a promissory note and this upon
a deed. The rules of evidence may be more
safely relaxed in.the one case than in the

other.

*

*

A deed is an act

*

of much higher force and solemnity in
the law.

*

*
*

I concurred in

that decision from a sense of the
great inconvenience of the English rule,
which applied to commercial paper, which
circulates with great facility and credit
without the encumbrance of a subscribing
witness, and because I did not recollect a
case in which the application of the rule
requiring the subscribing witness, did not
arise upon a specialty. We are not, therefore, at liberty to extend that decision to
deeds, and consequently, to all assurances
of real property." Fox v. Reil, 3 Johnson
476.
To the same extend the Pennsylvania
authorities have departed from the English rule. In Truby v. Byers, 6 Pa. 347,
it was held that the subscribing witnesses
to a deed must be called before execution
can be proved by secondary evidence.
Seeako Brobst v. Welker, 8 Pa. 467. The
action of the trial court in admitting secondary evidence to prove the execution of
a promissory note was affirmed in Williams
v. Floyd, 11 Pa. 499.
The case at bar, however, is to be distinguished from Fox v. Reil in that the admission which thedefendant sought to elicit
from the plaintiff would have been made,
if at all, in open court. Such an admission,
which is known as asolemn or judicial admission, is in fact no evidence, but a substitute for evidence. It dispenses with the
need of evidence. It would be an act of
folly for the plaintiff, at the call of the defendant, to voluntarily admit in the presence ofthe court and jury that he executed
the bill of sale and then attempt to prove
the contrary.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has
taken a like view of a similar case in which
Judge Campbell said: "It may be very
proper to allow a party to decline calling
his adversary, and to insist that this witness (subscribing) shall, if practical, be produced. But where one party is willing to
call the other, the latter can usually have
no reason to complain, and we think that
to this extent the reasoh of the rule has
very little force to prevent it, and should
not preclude such proof."
We believe, therefore, the plaintiff was
a competent witness.
On another principal his as well as the
defendant's proposed testimony was com-
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petent. The question directly in issue was
whether the defendant entered and destroyed by fire the plaintiffs house. The
title of the plaintiff as well as the commission of the tortious acts were the only questions directly in issue. The bill of sale was
merely a means empleyed by the defendant to disprove the plaintiff's claim of
title in himself, which was essential to his
right of recovery. When the execution of
an instrument is a collateral issue it may
be proved by any competent evidence, notwithstanding the fact that it purports to
have been witnessed by subscribing witnesses. Heckert v. Haine, 6 Binn. 16;
Mix. v. Smith, 7 Pa. 75; Wright v. Wood,
23 Pa. 120; and Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa.
452.
Judgement reversed and a v. f. d. n,
awarded.
FRED B. GERBER, J.
PILLER vs. SALLADY.
Mercantile agencies-Fraudin procuring
rating-Dutyto furnish true representations of assets and liabilities-Right of
subscribers to rely on such statements.

AmERMAN and JACOBS for plaintiff.
A subscriber is not always, and under all
circumstances bound to keep furnishing to
the agency from day to day the exact condition of his finances. Ralph v. Fondersmith, 10 Sup. C. 481; Cortland Mfg. Co.
v. Platt, 83 Mich. 419.
The truth or falsity of a representation
is to be ascertained by the jury, atthe time
the representation was made. Corbett v.
Gilbert, 24 Ga. 454; Rure v. Dumett, 145
Mass. 23.
Houcm and LLOYD for defendant.
Fraud must be established by direct
proof, or by facts to warrant its existence.
McAleer v. McMurray, 58 Pa. 126; Bigelow
on Torts p. 53.
Where a party makes false statements of
his solvency believing them to be true, he
is not liable in an action of deceit, or if the
plaintiff did not rely on any representation
made, there can be no recovery. Dilworth
v. Bradner, 85 Pa. 238.
Persons acting upon the report of a commercial agency, and being acquainted with
the statements upon which the report was
based, cannot maintain an action of deceit,
if the statements are false Poska v. Sterns,
42 L. R. A. 427.
.Inrelying upon statements made to a
commercial agency, due allowance must
be made for changes which may have taken
place. Achram v. Strouse, 28 S W. 262;
Curtis Brothers & Co. v. Hoxie, 88 Wis. 45.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Sallady, a merchant, for the purpose of
procuring a rating by Dunn & Co., a mercantile agency, delivered to it a statement
of assets and liabilities, showing the assets
to be three pieces of land worth $100,000,
and personalty worth $50,000, and his liabilities to be worth $78,000. Dunn & Co.
did not rely solely on this statement, but
on information from other sources in giving to Sallady his rating, viz, as worth
$200,000. This rating was, as was their
custom, sent to all merchants desiring to
deal with Sallady, and among them Piller,
who depending on it, sold $2800 of goods
to Sallady.
This sale occurred three months after
Sallady's statement to Dunn & Co., during
which time he had sold all his land, realizing in all $50,000 from it, applying it to
debts, and he had contracted an additional
$25,000 of debts.
Certain creditors levied an execution on
Sallady's property and sold it. This was
trespass for his fraud. Piller relied on Dunn
& Co. and swore that he would have made
the sale, had it been as of only $125,000.

The defendant in this case made certain
representations, as to his assets, to the Mercantile Agency of Dunn & Co. Relying on
this statement and from information received from other sources, he was given a
rating in excess of that fixed by himself.
It subsequently appeared that his assets
were considerably less than the amount
which he had stated. The plaintiff relying upon the rating of Dunn & Co., sold to
the defendant certain goods. Subsequently the sale of the property of the plaintiff
showed a large deficit, and this action was
brought to recover for the deceit which was
practiced upon him.
The representation made in this case and
alleged by the plaintiff to be false, was not
made directly to him, but to a mercantile
agency. This fact will not, however, relieve from responsibility, if the evidence
otherwise be sufficient to sustain a verdict.
"A subscriber to a commercial agency has
a right to rely on the fairness and honesty
of the statement of the financial condition
made by the other subscribers. The recording agency is the mutual agent of its subscribers in securing and communicating in-
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formation, and the subscribers must, from
the very nature of the business, know that
the rating is a representation of financial
standing as of near the date of publication
of the record book, and the representation
thus made is intended to reach and influence persons, who are entitled to see the
book." Ralph v. Fondersmith, 10 Sup.
481, 487; Silberman v. Munroe, 104 Mich.
352; Eaton v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 31.
To sustain the action, it is not necessary
that the fraudulent statement be made at
the time of the sale. Fechheimer & Co. v.
Baum & Bro., 2 L. R. A. 153; Ralph v.
Fondersmith, supra.
Though the period elapsing must be reasonable. Sharpless v. Gummey, 166 Pa.,
199.
But it is insisted that the statement relied upon in this case was not the one made
by the defendant, but a compilation by
the agency from other sources, in conjunction with it. This in itself is not sufficient
to prevent a recovery. It is proper to submit to the jury the question whether the
false representations furnished one of the
causes, ifnot the sole inducing cause, which
led to the sale in question. Tindle v. Biskett, 171 N. Y. 520; Morgan v. Skiddy, 62
N. Y. 316.
It was by reason of the failure of the
lower courts to distinguish in submitting
the case to the jury, between the question
as to whether the rating of the agency was
relied on, or the false statement of the defendant which led to the reversal in Poska
v. Sterns, 42 L. R. A. 427.
But is there sufficient evidence in this
case to submit to the jury and justify them
in finding that the representation of Sallady was an inducing cause? The statement to Dunn & Co. showed assets of but
$72,000, whereas the plaintiff testifies that
he would have made the sale had he been
rated at $125,000. We do not see, therefore,
how he could have been led to make the
sale by the false representation of the defendant. This determination renders unnecessary the consideration of the submission to the jury of the falsity of the statement made by the defendant. It may be
said, however, that if the evidence showed
a reliance upon Sallady's statement, we
would be bound to leave it to the jury to
say whether the defendant knew his statement was false, or whether the circumstances showed a reckless assertion in con-
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scious ignorance of fact.

Griswold v.

Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353; Erie City Iron Works
v. Barber, 106 Pa. 142.
Though it is not for them to determine
when the quesion of falsity is submitted,
whether he had reasonable grounds for
forming the belief, if,. as a matter of fact,
they found it existed. Lamberton v. Dunbam, 165 Pa. 125; Dilworth v. Bradner, 85
Pa. 235.
It being apparent, therefore, that the
representation, even if false, could not have
been an inducing cause which lea the
plaintiff to part with his property, the
motion for a compulsory non-suit is
granted.
SMITH vs. JONES.
Company doctors-Contractbetween employer and employee-Suit by third
party-No recovery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Samuel Jones, a railroad contractor, employed 500 men to perform certain work for
him. The men were to be paid by the day,
and 50 cents per month was to be held by
contractor from each laborer for medical
attendance.
Samuel Jones, the contractor, employed
a physician, Dr. Stone, at$75.00 per month,
to attend the laborers.
Some of the men, not wishing to have
Dr. Stone attend them, sought medical attention from Dr. Smith to the amount of
$350.00.
Dr. Smith now sues contractor Jones to
recover the $350.00 for the attention rendered during the several months.
DrvELY and HoucK for the plaintiff.
Money in hands of one for benefit of a
third party may be recovered by that third
party. Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts 104;
Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76.
Whether the party is specifically named
or not, where he may afterwards be determined. Keim v. Taylor, 11 Pa. 163; Binner v. Weeks, 159 Pa. 504.
The employer was the trustee of a fund
the equitable title of which was in the employees. Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76;
Bouvier's Law Diet. 1146; Black's Law
Dict. 1192. Even though the contract was
a parol one, 1 Hase, 158.
HILLYER and WILSON for the defendant.

The plaintift not being a party to contract must clearly show that there was a
trust fund for his benefit. Hostetter v.
Hollinger, 11 Pa. 611; Torrens v. Campbell,
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74 Pa. 476; Kourtz v. Holhouse, 85 Pa. 235.
And the contract must be for his explicit
benefit. Preeman v. Pa. R. R. Co., 173 Pa.
274; Benner v. Weeks, supra;Adams v.
Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The agreement between the contractor
and his employees was, that 50 cents per
month was to be withheld by the contractor from each laborer, for medical attendance. There was no stipulation in the
agreement as to the securing of any specified physician, but he was merely to secure
medical attendance, from which we can
presume that he was to use his discretion
in the matter, and contract with any physician he desired and at any price. The
court fails to see any ambiguity in the
words of the contract, as argued by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff.
The defendant contracted with Dr. Stone
to furnish the requisite attendance, and,
having done so, he fulfilled his obligations
under the contract. The employees were
under no obligations to have Dr. Stone provide medical treatment for them, but on
the contrary, they had perfect freedom to
procure any physician they desired, but,
by doing so, they could not bind the other
party to the contract. It is a well settled
rule that no one buta party to the contract
can maintain an action on it. Freem*han v.
P. R. R. 173 Pa. 274. In the case at bar,
the plaintiff in no wise participated in the
transaction and had no knowledge of it.
The plaintiff not being a party to the contract and the money not being placed in
the hands of the defendant for his use, he
cannot recover. Townsend v. Long, 27
P. F. Smith, 143.
Judgment for defendant.
WILLIAMSON, J.
OPINION OF TH'E SUPREME COURT.

The intention of the parties is not clearly
apparent, from the evidence before the trial
court. Jones was to retain 50 cents monthly from the wages of each workman; i. e.,
$250.00 per month. But was this retention
designed to be final? Should any particular workman not need medical attendance
during a month, was he entitled to the paymentof the 50 cents? If the $250 fund was
not wholly used up, in physicians' fees, was
the unused portion to be paid to the laborers, or was it to belong to Jones?
The sum of 60 cents would not be enough
to pay the fees for services becoming nec-

essary in the sickness of any particular person. The intention probably was, to raise
a fund out of which, if necessary, the fees
for service to any one or more of the laborers should be paid. The laborers would
form a species of beneficial society, for the
securing to such of them as should become
sick, the necessary physician's aid. Ten
might become sick, and the 490 remain
well, but the whole fund of $250 would be
consumed in furnishing the doctor for the
ten.
To carry out this object, it would be necessary, in all probability, that some single
mind should have the power to make contracts with the physician. It could hardly
have been intended that while A had a
right to the payment of the services of a
doctor, out of the fund, in excess of his contribution to it, he was to have the power
to select the physician and make contracts
with him. Unity of fund implies unity
of administration, and the selection of a
physician to attend to the needs of the entirebodyofmen. It would be possible to obtain at a cheaper rate the attention of one
physician to such of 600 men as should become sick, than that of 20 or 40 physicians
each for one sick man, without any prearrangement for the service and compensation. We are of opinion that the employment by some of the men of the physician
they pleased to employ, without regard to
the employment in behalf of the rest,
was not contemplated.
But, if we are mistaken in this, we cannot see how Dr. Smith can recover $350.
Has Jones so much in his hands after paying $75 per month to Dr. Stone? If Jones
has so much in his hands, in excess of any
claim of other physicians than Dr. Smith,
why should he pay it to Dr. Smith?
It is said that it is money put into his
hands to be paid to Dr. Smith, that is, certain laborers have left moneys with Jones,
to be paid to such physician as they should
subsequently engage. When the money
was retained by Jones, Smith had not been
engaged. The plaintiff insists on the principle that the money having been put into
Jones' hands for his benefit, he can
maintain an action on it.
Attempts
have been made to distinguish when,
money being paid by A to B for C,
o can, and when he cannot, sue B
for it.
The distinction is founded, in
Adams v. Kuhn 119 Pa. 84, and Freman v.
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R. R. Co. 173 Pa. 274, on the presence or
absence of a right in A to recover the
money from B, or, in other words on C be.
ing "the only party interested in the payment or delivery," or on B's payment toC
being for the benefit of A and enforceable
only by A. This alas! is no criterion at
all, for the question still recurs when is C
the only person interested, and when is A
the only person who can enforce the contract? A careful examination of the cases
fails to discover any tangible test. We
think the learned court below reached a
correct conclusion.
Judgment affirmed.
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the deposit, cannot be received in evidence.
Harvey v. Thornton, 14 Ill. 217; 5 W. & S.
266; Abboton Trial Evidence, 2nded., page
117; Sitter et al. v. Gehr, 105 Pa. 577.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question before us for decision in the
ease at bar is, whether or not the evidence
(I) of persons who had known the deceased, Sarah MacPherson, for twenty
years, and testified that they had never
heard of her being married or having a
son; (2) of persons who heard her say,
both before and after the date of the deposit, that she never had a son, is this
properly admitted? Hearsay evidenceis
admissible in' some cases; it is absolutely
JOHN AMBROSE, ADMt., vs. BANK.
necessary in cases, (1) of ecessity, i. e.,
the situation in which it is no longer
Parol evidence - Declarations of a de- possible to subject the person to oath and
ceased person as to pedigree-Decla- cross-examination, so that if his staterations only admissible when declarant ments are to be had at all, they must be
has no interest to misrepresent.
had without applying these securities for
trustworthiness. The typical instance of
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
this sort is in case of the death of proSarah MacPherson deposited $250.00 in
posed declarant; and the question is conthe bank, taking a certificate, payable to
stantly presented, under several of the
William MacPherson, whom she stated at
exceptions, whether absence from the
the time to be her son. After her death,
jurisdiction, insanity, or the like, is to be
Ambrose, her administrator, demanded
assimilated to the cause of death; in other
the money, but bank refused to pay him.
words, whether, as a general principl6, the
Four years after her death, this action
inavailability of the witness is a ground
was brought. No son had appeared to
for applying the exception to the rule. In
claim the deposit.
The administrator
therquestion of reputation, in certain cases,
offered evidence:
the difficulty, not of having the particular
(1)
Of persons who had known the deperson in court, but of getting better eviceased for twenty years, that they had dence in general, is regarded as sufficient.
never heard of her being married, or having
In the case before us, is the evidence the
a son.
best that could be had? The witnesses do
(2) Of persons who had heard her say,
not seem to bear any relation at all to the
both before and after the date of the dedeceased, Sarah MacPherson, therefore, is
posit, that she had never had a son.
it the best evidence that could be obtained?
The jury was permitted to find that
The best evidence that could have been
there never had been a son, and on its verprocured was from her family or relations,
dict, judgment was rendered for plaintiff.
if she had any. The facts are not clear, so
Motion for a new trial.
we will suppose that she had a relative;
BOUToN and BISHOP for plaintiff.
and again, the supposition could be just as
Pedigree or family history may be proved
well taken, that she did not have any relaby the declarations of a deceased member
tives at all. A sound general principle for
of the family. People v. Fire Insurance
determining whose declarations are receivCo., 25 Wend. 208; Covert v. Hertzog, 4
able was laid down by Lord Eldon: "The
Pa. 146; Oberstein's Appeal, 163 Pa. 14;
Greenleaf on Evidence, page 197.
tradition must be from persons having
YEAGLEY for defendant.
such a connectibn with the party to whom
There is a presumption that one who
it relates that it is natural and likely, from
dies intestate leaves issue. The evidence
their domestic habits and connections,
of those who testified to the marriage of
that they are speaking the truth, and that
Sarah MacPherson and to her having a
they could not be mistaken." It is now
son was not the best evidence. The declarations of Sarah MacPherson, made after
settled that the law resorts to hearsay evi-
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dence in cases of pedigree, upon the ground
of the interest of the declarants in the person from whom descent is made out, and
their consequent interest in knowing the
connections of the family. The rule of admission is, therefore, restricted to the
declarations of deceased persons who were
related by blood or marriage to the person
testifying.
General reputation in the
family,proved by asurvivingmemberof the
family, has also been considered as falling
within this rule. It is also proper in some
cases to hear testimony of acquaintances
and neighbors as to reputation, also reputation in the neighborhood or among acquaintances generally, has often been considered admissible under local conditions.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in
the case before us, as to evidence (1) of persons who had known deceased for twenty
years, that they had never heard of her
having been married, or having had a son,
was properly admitted. This is evidence under the hearsay rule, that is
admissible as to deceased's general reputation in the community. People who
knew of deceased's life, and were her
neighbors and acquaintances for twenty
years, are allowed to testify as to what
they know regarding deceased's reputation
and life. They seem to have been the best
witnesses obtainable, and on this point we
must say there is no error in allowing it to
go to the jury. As to the second piece of
evidence, (2) of persons who had heard her
say, both before and after the date of the
deposit, that she had never had a son, we
find no error in the first part as to state,ments made before the deposit, but the
9econd part we do find an error. The second part of the above statement should not
have been allowed to go to the jury. It
was in her own interest to make such a
statement, both for her reputation's sake
and in her own interest. If it had been at
variance with her own interest, it would
have been admissible, otherwise not.
"Greenleaf
on Evidence,"
page 282.
Whether or not Sarah MacPherson had a
son must be decided when the case goes
back for a new trial. Even Mrs. MacPherson's statement, that she had no son,
may be rebutted by the deposit in bank of
money for one Win. MacPherson. In view
of the error in second part of evidence,

submitted to the jury, we must grant the
motion for a new trial.
Motion is therefore granted.
DELANEY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

The deposit was made by Mrs. MaePherson, and, it must be presumed, the
money belonged to her. She took a certificate, payable to Win. MacPherson,
averred by her to be her son. The only
evidence of the existence of such a person,
is this averment. If there was no such
son, the money was payable to her. Four
years have elapsed since her death, and
no son has appeared to claim the deposit.
How long before her death the deposit was
made, does not appear. If a son then
existed, there is no presumption that he
died before his mother, and if he has died
since, his administrator, not the plaintiff,
should receive the deposit from the bank.
Against the averment of the existence
of a son, there was the testimony of persons who had known the deceased for 20
years, that they had never heard of her
having been married, or having had a son.
The improbability that they could not have
heard of these facts, had they been facts,
is considerable, and was properly submitted to the jury.
Her declarations before making the deposit, that she had never had a son, were
properly received. If she had recognized
X as her son, this recognition could have
been proven, as evidence of the relation.
A general denial that she had a son, should
be received for the same reason. The son,
were there such, would know that he was
her son, and so would others, only by her
recognition. Her disavowal of X asa son,
should be evidence that he was not. Declarations may be employed to disprove, as
well asto prove, pedigree. Washington v.
Bank of Savings, 171 N. Y. 166.
The learned court below has excluded
the decedent's declarations made after the
deposit, to the effect that she had no son,
on the ground that such declarations were
in, and not against, her own interest. The
interest suggested, is the desire to avoid a
reputation for unchastity, and the desire
to make a title for herself to the deposit
which would otherwise be her son's. The
rule has been recognized that the declaraut
in pedigree eases, "must, at the time, have
no interest to misrepresent." Greenleaf
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16th Ed. p. 202. It must be conceded, we
think, that there was an apparent interest
to misrepresent. In Washington v. Bank
for Savings, 171 N. Y. 166, the representation, though made after the making of
the deposit, were held to have been
properly received, the objection urged by
the court below not having been made.
We think the case below properly decided.
Judgment affirmed.
HOLMES vs. RAILROAD CO.
Evidence-Bight of physiciansto testify to
patient's admissions-Act of June 18,
1895, explained.
STATEfENT OF THE CASE.

Holmes had his foot amputated by the
car of defendant at a station. The defendant alleged that Holmes had deliberately placed his foot on the rail in order
that it might be run over, for the purpose
of obtaining money on an accident insurance policy and also from the railroad
company.
To do this, it called the physician employed by Holmes immediately after the
accident, to testify that Holmes while suffering great pain, had admitted to him
that he had purposely placed his foot on
the rail. This was stated, when not under,
and also, when under, the influence of
anaesthetics.
Verdict for defendant. Appeal.
DEvERt and COOPER for plaintiff.
Information acquired by a physician
acting, in his profession, necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and
which tends to blacken the character of
the patient cannot be admitted in evidence
without his consent. Actof June 18,1895,
P. L. 195, Wells v. Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 167.
Fraud tends to blacken character. 141
Pa. 214.
WILLIAMSON and WRIGHT for defend-

ant
Statements made by a patient to his
physician must be necessary to enable the
physician to treat the patient properly,
even though they do blacken character.Eddington v. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185; Feeny
v. R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 880; Irwin v. Keen,
3 Wharton 347.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question involved in this case is
whether or not the attending physician
was a competent witness for the defendant
company in this action against them for

4,

injuries, alleged by the plaintiff, to have
been received at their hands.
The company defend the action on the
grounds that plaintiff was himself responsible for the injuries complained of, and
they rely on certain statements made by
plaintiff to this witness (the physician)
while the latter was caring for and waiting upon the plaintiff, Holmes.
The statement which defendant company allege to have been made, was to the
effect that Holmes,plaintiffhad (while under and also while not under the influence
of anssthetics) told the physician that he,
plaintiff, had deliberately placed his foot
upon a rail of defendant company's road
that it might be run over, thereby enabling
him tobring this actionfor damages against
said defendant company, and also against a
certain insurance company of which, we
presume, he was a member. The physician
is now called as a witness, to testify to the
alleged statements, and it is our duty, at
this time, to examine the respective provisions of the Act above referred to, that
we may ascertain whether or not the physician is or is not a competent witness
under the circumstances.
The prohibition consists in the words,
"o person authorized, etc." shall be allowed to disclose any information, because
of the professional relation between himself and patient. But may not statements
made to a physician when not acting in a
professional capacity and which are clearly
not necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, be admitted? We think so, and
are unable to see how plaintiff's statement,
as to how the injury occurred could in any
sense tend to assist, the physician in the
performance of the operation, or how this
information was, in any light, necessary
to enable the attending physician to
properly perform the duties of his profession. Had the statement in question resulted from, or grown out of questions
asked plaintiff concerning his condition,
we would not hesitate to say that the physician was clearly incompetent, under the
act, but such is not the case, the informa
tion was voluntarily given, and was foreign to anything concerning the nature of
the injury or the, method of its treatment.
"Trickett on Witnesses" refers to the
case of Wells v. New England Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 166-and a reference to it
at this time, may serve to show why the
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physician's testimony in that case was by
J. Gunster held inadmissible. The state
ment made was to the effect that "sie
(Plaintiff) had had as many as six abortions, had always gotten well and could
now." This being a statement that bore
directly on the object of the physician's
visit, and which would doubtless influence
him in the discharge of professional advice, can readily be distinguished from the
case at bar, for the remark here was as to
how the injury occurred, and a hope that
damages might be recovered.
For the
reasons given the motion for a new trial is
overruled..
WATSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The incompetency created by the act of
June 18th, 1895. is (1) of one authorized to
practice physic or surgery, "and (2) with
respect to information (a) acquired" in attending a patient in a professional capacity, which, (b) was necessary to enable
hint to act, and (c) which tends to blacken
the patient's character.
The physician employed by Holmes was
the witness. Though it does not affirmatively appear that he was "authorized to
practice" surgery, we cannot presume that
he was violating the law in practicing it.
.The information he obtained was not
simply that arising from his observation,
but also that communicated to him by the
patient's statement. Both of these informations, we doubt not, are protected
by the act, from revelation by the surgeon.
In Wells v. N. England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 187 Pa. 166, both species were
held protected by the lower court, that
obtained by the observation of the physician and that revealed to him by the
patient's verbal disclosures.
It is not enough that the information be
obtained "in attending a patient." Many
things not at all pertinent to his case, may
be talked of by the patient with his physician. The information must be necessary
to enable the physician to act.
Too strict an interpretation, however,
must not be placed on these words. We
take it, that if it reasonably appears that
the patient believed the communication
to be needful to enable the surgeon to
act, it will be immune from disclosure,
although in fact the surgeon might have
properly treated the case without it. Coin-

munications to an attorney are protected,
though they are not strictly relevant to
the affair committed to the attorney.
Witnesses, p. 17. The object of the act of
1895 was, we think, to permit the free
employment of a physician, without the
risk of having the information obtained by
him, as a means of performing his duties,
revealed to others. Patients are often
ignorant, or weak, and the end of the
statute would be only half accomplished,
if revelations made by them under the
belief that they were necessary, might
still be extracted from the physician, because they had not been strictly necessary.
Holmes had had his foot cut off by a
car. The service of a physician was necessary. A reasonable inquiry would be, how
did the amputation occur? Whether the
surgeon asked him the question, or
whether anticipating it, Holmes answered
it, is unimportant. We think the patient
may account to the surgeon for the state
in which he is, which requires the
surgeon's aid, without the peril of having
the account revealed by the latter.
The information must tend to "blacken
the character" of the patient. We know
no scale by which we can classify the
hues of the various criminal or dishonorable acts of men. Some such acts may be
black, some brown, some red, and some
yellow. To impute to a man, a murder,
or rape, or robbery, or larceny, would
doubtless tend in the popular sense of the
word, to "blacken" his character.
To
impute to him unchastity, or fraud, would
do the same. We are not prepared to say
that the act imputed, must be a felony,
or even a misdemeanor. The court may
judicially know that some acts, not forbidden by the criminal code, do 'blacken"
the character, in the sense of disgracing.
Cf. Galbraith v. Eichelberger, 3 Y, 515.
We think we shall best carry out the intention of the legislature, by holding that
when the fact would disgrace, orstiginatize
the patient, if known, when the imputation of it would be a slander or a libel if
untrue, the physician cannot be allowed
without the patient's consent, to reveal it.
Our conclusion is not in certain conflict
with the decision in a similar statute,
found in Green v. Met. St. Railway Co.,
171 N. Y. 201.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
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SMITH vs. DUBOIS PASSENGER
RAILWAY CO.
Bill in equity-Edsements-Ancientwater
course-Secaured by grant-Bights of
dominant owner.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant, an electric railway company, erected a railroad on an ancient
water course, running almost all over
it. The erection of this road was commenced without obtaining the permission
of the party having the easement. The
deeds were properly recorded, so that the
company had notice of this easement.
The water course could easily be detected.
Thedefendantcompany proposed to build
another water course,runningparallel with
the other water course, a few feet farther
north. The defendant wished to make
this exchange for the water course it took,
on which the road was erected.
The defendant company purchased the
land upon which the water course was
located from a third party.
There is some evidence to show that one
end of the water course had been diverted
by the owner of the fee, without any protest from the holder of the dominant
estate.
The water course had not been used for
from twenty-one to thirty-six years. Defendant company, however, having just
taken possession a few months ago. This
is a bill in equity to restrain the company
from further prosecuting the construction
of said railroad on said water course.
Has defendant company a right to take
siaid water course without consent of holder
of dominant estate ?
GROSS and WATSON for complainant.

An easement secured by grant is not extinguished by mere non-user. Erb v.
Brown, 69 Pa. 216; Bombaugh v. Miller,
82 Pa. 203; Weaver v. Getz, 16 Pa. Sup.
418.
The company had not the right to substitute the second water course for the first.
Manaber v. Jones, 190 Pa. 171.
Street R. R. Co. cannot set up right of
eminent domain. Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Montg. Pass. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 62; Penna.
Canal Co. v. Lewisburg Pass. Ry. Co., 10
Sup. 413.
Injunction is the proper remedy. Act
of June 19, 1871, P. L. 1360; Earley's Appeal, 121 Pa. 498.
GERBER and SHERBINE for respondent.
The owner of the fee has the right to the

enjoyment fany use of his estate consistent with the servitude to which it is subjected. Slepenson v. Stewart, 7 Phila.
93: Clinden v. Lathrop, 21 Pick. 292:;
Am. & Eng. Encyc. (old ed.), Vol. 6, page
152; also Vol. 10, page 429.
Change of character distinguished from
change of location. Johnston v. Hyde, 32
N. J. E. 446; Allen v. Land Co., 92 Cal.
138.
Unless otherwise shown, the easement
Is in the right to the flow of the water, not
in the bed of the stream. Jackson v. Halstead, 5 (Cowen) N. Y. 216.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Defendant commenced to build an electric road over an ancient water course,
without obtaining permission from the
party having the easement. The deeds
were properly recorded so that defendant
had notice of this easement. From the
above we are led to infer that this was an
artificial water course, created by grant,
since its existence was on record. Whether
its purpose was to convey water to or from
the dominant estate is immaterial. Although it had not been used for from 21
years to 36 years, we do not think plaintiff
had lost his easement by abandonment.
The three 4lements of abandonment are
not present. The condition of non-user is
present, butpermitting a partial diversion
of the water course at an earlier date, does
not justify an inference that there was an
intention to abandon the water course.
Even though there was an intention to
abandon the water course, the facts 4o not
warrant the inference that defendant knew
of it, and relying upon such knowledge
began the construction of the road. Plaintiff has an interest in the land owned by
defendant, created by grant, conferring a
right of maintaining a water course over
landg of defendant. It remains to be considered whether defendant should be permitted to alter the location of this water
course.
In Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278, deciding that a party owning a servient estate
could not substitute a flume in place of an
open ditch, court said "We know of no
principle of law or power in a court of
equity to justify or authorize such an invasion of the property rights of one private
party to serve the wishes or necessities of
another priyate party. Its practical application wouid result in a system of judicial
condemnation of property of one citizen to
answer an assumed paramount necessity
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of another citizen." In J unison v. Walker,
11 Gray 423, the owner of the dominant
estate attempted to lay water pipes in a
place other than the location of the original grant. Although this case differs from
the one we are considering, in that the
complaint, was made by the owner of-the
servient, while here the complainant is the
holder of the dominant estate, the court
held, that the location of an easement,
when once established, cannot be altered
by either party without the consent of the
other.
In Wynkoop v. Burger, 12 Johns (N.Y.)
222, wherein the servient owner attempted
to change the location of a right of way
across his estate, the court held that it
would be extremely unjust to allow the
servient owner to he changing the road
In Johnston v.
whenever he pleased.
Hyde, 32 N. J. E. 455, when the owner of
the servient estate attempted to substitute
a covered way for an open ditch, the court
held it could not compel Mr. Hyde to accept the substitute, the covered for the
open race way.
In Bannon v. Angler, 2 Allen 128, the
servient owner obstructed the easement or
way which had been created by grant, and
where there appeared to be a non-user, but
without proof of adverse enjoyment by the
owner of the servient estate. It was held
that there was not sufficient proof of abandonment of the way, also that the grantor
cannot defend by showinganother way in
a different line or direction, although it
may be equally convenient with the privilege originally granted. In the Orphans'
Home v. The Hydraulic Association, 64
N. Y. 561, defendant was granted a right
in general terms to construct a dam. It
was held that "when the grantees located
and built their dam, the grant became and
was as specific in respect to the land to be
occupied under the grant, as if they had
been particularly described in it. From
that time neither the grantor nor the
grantees could, without the consent of the
other party in interest, change the location of the dam." Servitudes adopted by
the owner of land, which are visible and
notorious, become, when the land is divided and passes into other hands, permanent appurtenances thereto, and neither
the owner of the dominant or servient portions of the laud have power adversely to
interfere with the proper use and enjoy-

ment. Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178;
Overdeer v. Updegraft, 69 Pa. 110; Manbeck v. Jones, 190 Pa. 171. We do not
think we should consider whether complainant will be injured by the construction of this road. He has a right to insist
that the easement which he is entitled to
in the servient estate shall not be interfered with.
Let the injunction be granted.
PEIGHTEL, J.
BROWN vs. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Assignment ofpolicy-Faiure
to pay premiums-F_ aud of Insurance
Company.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Hammond, indebted to Harper in the
sum of $2,000, obtains from the defendant
compahy a policy of life insurance for
$1,500, making it payable to Harper. A
premium fell due August 11, 1900, which
has not been paid, and Hammond died
December 13, 1900.
Hammond was in the habit of paying
the premiums, but on two occasions Harper had inquired of the company within
thirty days after the day of payment,
whether it had been paid. Thirty days of
grace were allowed by the policy. On
August 26th, Harper inquired again
whether the premium had been paid,
and was informed by the general agent
that it had been. After Hammond's
death, he was informed that the policy
would not be paid, because the premium
had, in fact, not been paid. Hammond assigned the policy to Brown, who had once
been a local, agent of the company, and
who had learned that the premium had
not been paid. The assignment purported
to be for the sum $1.00, and no other consideration appeared.'
YEAGLEY for plaintiff.
Harper had an insurable interest. The
Insurance Company is estopped to set up
the fact that the premium was not paid, by
the declaration of its general agent that it
had been paid. American Life and Health
Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Pa. 189; Cunninghain v. Smith, 70 Pa. 450; Carson's
Appeal, 113 Pa. 438; Smith v. Cash. Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 24 Pa. 320.
WALSH and WRIGHT for defendant.
The Insurance Company is not estopped
by statement of its agent- the premium
not having been paid within the time

THEFORUM
specified by the policy, the policy is absolutely void. Lycoming Ins. Co. v. SteVens, 97 Pa. 354; Pottsville Ins. Co. v.
Minnegan, 100 Pa. 137; Chorteaux v.
Leech, 18 Pa. 225.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Hammond, indebted to Harper in $2,000,
obtained from defendant a policy of life insurance for S1,500, making it payable to
Harper. A premium fell due Aug. 11,
1900, which has not been paid, and Hammond died Dec. 13, 1900. Hammond was
in the habit of payilig the premiums, but
on two occasions Harper had inquired
within thirty days after the day of payment, whether it had been paid. Thirty
days of grace were allowed by the policy.
On Aug. 26, Harperinquired again whether
the premium had been paid, and was informed by the general agent that it had
been. After Hammond's death, he was
informed that the policy would not be
paid because the premium had, in fact, not
been paid. Harper assigned the policy to
Brown, who had once been a local agent
of the Company, and who had learned
that the premium had not been paid. The
assignment purported to be for $1.00, and
no other consideration appeared.
Harper was a creditor at the time the
insurance was affected, and had an insurable interest in the life of Hammond.
American Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Pa. 189.
The policy was for $500 less than the
amount of the debt and was taken by
Harper as collateral security for the whole
debt. His right to obtain the money on
the policy at Hammond's death was contingent upon the fact that Hammond
should die before satisfying the debt.
Hammond died without satisfying the
debt and in the ordinary sequence of
things, the Insurance Co. would have to
pay Harper the amount of the policy.
The Insurance Company now claims
that the premiums were not paid when
due, before Hammond's death, and that
the policy has become void Let us take a
a resumt of the facts. The premium became due Aug. 11, 1900. Thirty days of
grace in payment were allowed by the
policy. Hammond died Dec. 13, 1900. On
Aug. 26, 1900, fifteen days after the policy
became due and within the days of grace
allowed, Harper inquired of the general
agent of the Company if the premium had
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been paid, and was informed that it had
been. It is clear that the premium was
not paid and the question now is, would
this defeat Harper's right of recovery on
the policy?
It is a general principle that when a
premium is not paid at the time due, the
policy becomes void. It was Hammond's
duty tosee that the premiums were paid,
and to- Harper's advantage to see them
paid. As Harper had an interest in the
policy, he had the right to inquire whether
or not the premiums were paid, and also
the right to be correctly informed to that
point. He sought the proper means of informing himself and relied upon the information given. The general agent Was
a part of the Company, and no one could
be better informed. The result of his information is that the premium was not
paid. But now the Tnsurance Company
is estopped to deny that it was not paid.
Any other holding would be in effect to
allow the Insurance Company to take advantage of its own fraud. It is also well
settled that no Insurance Company can
take advantage of a deceit practiced, causing a forfeiture in order to obtain a forfeiture. Helme v. Phila. Ins. Co., 61 Pa. 107.
Defendant's contention, that the policy
was void when Harper made inquiry, is
based on the claim that the days of grace
allowed was a mere allowance, revocable
at any time by the company, and that. the
company in this case" had revoked the allowance before Harper inquired. It must
be noticed that the thirty days of grace
were part of the policy, the contract.
Therefore, their contention is unsound.
The case of Lantz v. Ins. Co., 139 Pa. 546,
has no application.
At Hammond's death, Harper's interest
became absolute, an interest or chose in
action assignable at will. Sibbald's Estate,
18 Pa. 249. Hence, we are unable to see
with what reason or authority the company can contest the validity of the assignment to Brown. Both Harper and
Brown are satisfied with the assignment,
and when the policy is paid once it will
not have to be paid again. Brown, the
plaintiff, who had been an agent of the
company, had learned that the premium
was not paid; but it does not appear
whether this knowledge came to him before the expiration of the thirty days of
grace or thereafter. In either case, the
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knowledge of Brown cannot be imputed
to Harper so as to defeat Harper's right of
action. Harper assigned a valid claim,
and Brown takes just what interest Harper had. The inadequacy of consideration
is not of itself evidence from which fraud
or collusion between the parties can be inferred.
Judgment for plaintiff for $1,500 and
costs.
W. N. COOPER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
One premium, that falling due on Aug.

1ltb, 1900, has not been paid and more
than the period of grace, one month, has
elapsed. This would entitle the company
to treat the contract as ended, but for the
further fact disclosed. Harper before the
lapse of 30 days, inquired of the company
whether the premium had been paid. The
company informed him that it had been.
But for this, he could, and we must assume, would have paid the premium within the thirty days. Whether the company
was bound to answer his inquiry or not,
it was bound if it answered at all, to
answer truly, or to give Harper an opportunity, on discovering his mistake, occasioned by its error, to make the payment.

The action is for the use of Brown, who
had been local agent of the company, and
learned that the premium had not been
paid. These facts do not prevent a recovery. An assignment of the policy is
not vicious, because the assignee was, at a
former time, an agent of the Insurance
Company. The additional fact that, while
such, he learned that the premium had
not been paid, does not preclude his recovering. He is not employing the knowledge
thus learned, to the disadvantage of his
former employer. On the contrary, he is
contending that despite that knowledge,
he has the right which his assignor had
by reason of the ignorance of the latter.
He is seeking to gain, not by the fact
which he learned, but by the supposititious
fact which his assignor was by the company's mistake, induced to believe.
But for the assignment, the company
would have been compelled to pay the
policy to Harper. His transfer of it, in
no way lessens that liability. Whether
the circumstances justify Harper rescinding the transfer and appropriating the
money to himself that may be recovered
in this suit we are not called upon to decide. Meeder v. Provident S. L. Ass. Co.,
171 N. Y. 432.
Judgment affirmed

